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EXPRESSIVISM AND THE PRACTICALITY OF MORAL CONVICTIONS  
Neil Sinclair (neil.sinclair@nottingham.ac.uk) 
NB. This is an early draft of a much longer version of the paper which appeared in 
The Journal of Value Inquiry 2007. In particular §§3-4 contain much material omitted 
from the version published there.  
 
Abstract. Many expressivists have employed a claim about the practicality of morality in 
support of their view that moral convictions are not purely descriptive mental states. In 
this paper I argue that all extant arguments of this form fail. I distinguish six versions of 
such arguments and argue that in each case either the sense of practicality the argument 
employs is too weak, in which case there is no reason to think that descriptive states 
cannot be practical or the sense of practicality the argument employs is too strong, in 
which case there is no reason to think moral convictions are practical. I also discuss and 
dismiss an attempted patch of such arguments provided by Humean Psychology. The 
conclusion is that expressivists need to look to sources other than the alleged practicality 
of morality to support their position. In concluding remarks I suggest one such 
alternative. 
 
If Mary comes to think that testing cosmetics on animals is wrong, we would expect 
her to avoid purchasing cosmetics that have been tested on animals and to become 
agitated at others who refuse to do the same. Conversely, if Brian attends rallies 
supporting bans on cosmetics testing on animals, refuses to buy products that have 
been tested on animals and encourages others to do likewise we would expect him to 
be of the opinion that testing cosmetics on animals is wrong. At least, in both cases, 
should our expectations be confounded there is usually some explanation of why 
things haven‟t turned out as we thought they would. In both these ways agents‟ moral 
judgements are intimately connected to their actions and affections.  
Many expressivists have used a view about the nature of this connection in 
arguments for their position. They have argued that moral judgements exhibit a 
connection to actions and affections that no expression of a purely descriptive state 
could share. Hence, they conclude, moral judgements cannot be understood 
descriptively. Expressivists to have used this approach include Ayer, Urmson, 
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Stevenson, Hare, Nowell-Smith, Blackburn and Gibbard.
1
 I shall call such approaches 
arguments from practicality. In this paper I aim to show that no such argument is 
successful.  
 
In the next section I set out the core commitments of expressivism and it‟s 
rival descriptivism. In §2 I set out the general form of arguments from practicality 
using Hume as exemplar. Such arguments rely on the claim that moral convictions are 
practical in a way that purely descriptive states of mind are not. In §3 I distinguish 
four plausible senses in which moral convictions are practical. I then argue in §4 that 
there is no reason to think that purely descriptive states of mind cannot be practical in 
precisely these senses. In §5 I suggest two further senses in which moral convictions 
might be practical. Unfortunately for expressivists, these senses also fail to provide 
successful arguments for their position, both because there is little reason to suppose 
moral convictions are practical in these senses (§6) and because even if we suppose 
they were, this admission is compatible with descriptivism if moral convictions are 
what I call „hybrid‟ states (§7). Finally, in §8 I argue that a distinctively Humean 
reason to doubt the existence of such states fails. The conclusion is that no argument 
for expressivism based on the alleged practicality of moral convictions succeeds. In 
my concluding remarks I suggest an alternative line of argument for the expressivist.  
 
1. Descriptivism and Expressivism 
 
Descriptivists in ethics hold that moral judgements express beliefs that represent the 
world in moral ways, the upshot of such expression being a putative description of the 
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world as containing (or realising) moral states of affairs.
2
 Expressivists, by contrast, 
deny that moral judgements express such beliefs. Instead, they claim, moral 
judgements express affective mental states such as approval and disapproval, the 
purpose of this expression being the mutual co-ordination of attitudes.
3
 These 
characterisations can be made more precise by introducing some terminology. 
First, the crux of the debate is over the state of mind that moral judgements 
express, where moral judgements are sincere utterances of declarative moral 
sentences. Call the states thus expressed moral convictions. The declarative sentences 
used to express such states provide their content. For example, if an agent sincerely 
utters the sentence „Testing cosmetics on animals is wrong‟ then her moral conviction 
is a state of mind with content capturable by that very sentence. When, as in this case, 
the content can be captured using a moral sentence, I shall call this moral content.  
Second, the debate concerns whether moral convictions are beliefs of a certain 
sort. Here a belief is mental state that represents the world, or some part of it, as being 
thus-and-so. I shall call such states descriptively representational and the way they 
represent the world as being their descriptive content. Thus if I believe that it is 
raining outside my meteorological conviction is a descriptively representational state 
of mind with the following descriptive content: It is raining outside. Descriptively 
representational states are to be contrasted with other states that represent the world, 
not as being thus-and-so, but so as to be made thus-and-so. I shall call these states 
directively representational and the way they represent the world so as to be made 
their directive content.
4
 Desires are the paradigm examples of directively 
representational states. Thus if I desire an end to poverty, my desire is a directively 
representational state of mind with the following directive content: There is no 
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poverty.
5
 The distinction between descriptively and directively representational 
mental states is sometimes cashed out in terms of their respective directions of fit. So 
whereas descriptively representational states have as their constitutive aim or function 
that their contents match the state of the world (mind-to-world direction of fit), 
directively representational states have as their constitutive aim or function to impose 
themselves on the world in such a way that the world come to match their content 
(world-to-mind direction of fit).
6
 I here endorse this way of elaborating the 
distinction.  
Given these definitions the core claim of descriptivism is: 
 
D. The moral content of moral convictions is descriptive content.   
 
In other words, moral judgements express moral beliefs. Expressivists, in contrast, 
hold both: 
 
E1.  The moral content of moral convictions is not descriptive content.  
 
And: 
 
E2. Moral convictions have distinctive non-moral directive content. 
 
E1 is equivalent to the claim that moral judgements do not express moral beliefs. E2 
is the beginning of a positive characterization of the states such judgements express. 
According to a simple version of expressivism, for example, moral judgements 
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express states of approval and disapproval. On such a view Mary‟s judgement that 
testing cosmetics on animals is wrong expresses disapproval of testing cosmetics on 
animals. This disapproval is a directively representational state that represents that 
world so as to be made that: No one tests cosmetics on animals. The italicised 
sentence gives the directive content of the state, which since it involves no moral 
terms, is not moral content. So one part of expressivists‟ positive claim is that moral 
judgements express states of mind with non-moral directive contents. Expressivists 
must also claim, of course, that the attitude thus expressed is distinct from more 
mundane attitudes of approval and disapproval, lest moral judgements are equated 
with simple judgements of taste. For the sake of argument I shall here grant 
expressivists this claim.
7
 
 
2. Hume and the General Form of Arguments from Practicality 
 
Now to arguments from practicality. Perhaps the most famous example comes from 
Hume: 
 
Since morals…have an influence of the actions and affections, it follows, 
that they cannot be deriv‟d from reason; and that because reason 
alone…can never have any such influence. Morals excite passions, and 
produce or prevent actions. Reason itself is utterly impotent in this 
particular. The rules of morality, therefore, are not the conclusions of 
reason.
8
 
 
“Expressivism and the Practicality of Moral Convictions” by Neil Sinclair 
 
6 
Here moral convictions („morals‟) are claimed to have a practical role that beliefs (the 
states controlled by „reason‟) cannot fulfil. Hence moral convictions cannot be beliefs, 
that is, descriptively representational mental states.  
 
 This passage nicely illustrates the general form of arguments from practicality: 
 
(1) Moral convictions are practical in some specific sense. 
(2) No purely descriptively representational state can be practical in the same 
specific sense. 
Therefore: 
(3) Moral convictions are not purely descriptively representational states. 
   
In this schema (and throughout) „practical‟ is a gloss on „connected to actions and 
affections‟. There are three points worth noting about arguments of this form. 
 First, there is an obvious and fatal flaw in taking (1)-(3) to establish 
expressivism: namely that the conclusion of the argument is actually compatible with 
a version of descriptivism.
9
 Descriptivists hold that the moral content of moral 
convictions is descriptive content. These leaves open two possible versions of 
descriptivism: according to the first moral convictions are purely descriptive 
representational states, their moral content being part or whole of their descriptive 
content; according to the second moral convictions are not purely descriptively 
representational states because although their moral content is descriptive content they 
also possess some distinct non-descriptive content. The conclusion of arguments from 
practicality is only that moral convictions are not purely descriptively representational 
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states, but this is only incompatible with the first form of descriptivism. So arguments 
from practicality are at best arguments against one of two forms of descriptivism. In 
light of this, in §§3-5 I argue that most arguments from practicality fail even in the 
narrow aim of refuting the first kind of descriptivism. In §§6-8 I argue that, even if 
some arguments from practicality force us to abandon the first version of 
descriptivism, the second version remains a viable possibility. Either way, arguments 
from practicality fail to establish expressivism.   
Second, as Snare has pointed out, for arguments of this type to be successful, 
at least one of the premises must be an a priori truth.
10
 For all the arguments from 
practicality that follow I shall assume that for at least one of the premises is known a 
priori and hence that Snare‟s snare can be avoided.  
Finally, it is informative to note ways in which arguments of this type may 
fail. Besides equivocation on the term „practical‟ there are two main sources of error. 
In the first case, arguments of this type will fail if the type of practicality assigned to 
moral convictions is too weak, for this is liable to make the second premise false or 
unsupported. If the connection between moral convictions and actions and affections 
is weak, it is likely that purely descriptively representational states can also have such 
a connection, calling premise (2) into doubt. In the second case, arguments of this 
type will fail if the type of practicality assigned to moral convictions is too strong, for 
this is liable to make the first premise false or unsupported. If the conditions for 
practicality are too strict, it is likely that although purely descriptively representational 
states cannot be practical, nor can moral convictions.
11
 In what follows I shall argue 
that arguments employing the first four senses of practicality fail for the first reason 
“Expressivism and the Practicality of Moral Convictions” by Neil Sinclair 
 
8 
while those employing the fifth and sixth senses of practicality fail for the second 
(among others).  
 
3. Four Plausible Senses of Practicality 
 
3.1. Moral convictions have normative content 
 
The first sense in which moral convictions are practical is that they are a species of 
normative convictions. Moral convictions concern how we should live, how we ought 
to act and so on. The terms that characterise moral convictions – should, good, right, 
cruel and so on – are normative, that is, they serve to indicate a standard or „norm‟ by 
which to judge and direct conduct. For example, when Mary holds that testing 
cosmetics on animals is wrong, she is recommending a certain path of action: she is 
directing us not to test cosmetics on animals (or to endorse such testing). It is this 
„directedness‟ that I take to be captured by the claim that moral convictions have 
normative content.
12
 
 It is helpful here to introduce a distinction between recognising and embracing 
norms.
13
 When I claim „One ought not to slurp one‟s food‟ my claim reflects the 
recognition of a certain norm of behaviour is recommended from a particular point of 
view, in this case, the point of view of (western) etiquette. In other examples, such as 
the claim that „It is illegal to trespass on private property‟ the particular point of view 
is more perspicuous. In order to be moved by either claim, however, I must not only 
recognise the norm but also embrace it, that is, roughly, I have to want to obey it. 
Without this additional state of mind, the claim will not affect my actions.  
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 The question arises whether moral convictions are constituted by recognition 
of a norm of behaviour or by recognition plus an embracing of that norm. There is 
certainly a sense in which one‟s moral views can be „read off‟ the norms of behaviour 
one embraces. This is the sense in which Brian (in the opening paragraph) has a moral 
conviction merely by dint of the fact that he acts as he does. In this sense of „moral 
conviction‟ one‟s moral convictions are indeed constituted by the norms of behaviour 
one endorses. Unfortunately, this is not obviously the sense of „moral conviction‟ 
with which we are concerned. The focus of this enquiry is the nature of that state of 
mind expressed by moral judgements and it is an open question whether these two 
senses of „moral conviction‟ are co-extensive. Furthermore, in the case of all other 
norms – such as those of etiquette or the law – we are capable as reflective beings of a 
reasoned assessment of their basis and thus of reflecting on them without embracing 
them. Absent any reason to think that moral norms provide an exception to this rule, 
there is no reason to think that we cannot make the distinction between recognising 
and embracing in the case of moral norms too.  
 All we can say for now, therefore, is that moral convictions are practical in 
that, like other normative convictions, they consist in recognition that a particular way 
of behaving is recommended (or discouraged) from a particular point of view. In their 
case, the point of view is that of morality.
14
 I shall summarise this sense of practicality 
by saying that moral convictions are about how we should act and feel, where 
„should‟ is a gloss on „should, according to a particular point of view‟.  
 That moral convictions are practical in this way has two important 
consequences.  
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 First, that there are determinate ways in which agents can act in accordance 
with and contrary to moral convictions. To act in accordance with a particular piece 
of normative content is to act in ways that a person expressing that content 
recommends and to refrain from acting in ways that a person expressing that content 
discourages. Thus if Mary holds that testing cosmetics on animals is wrong she 
recognises that testing cosmetics on animals is not recommended from the moral point 
of view. If Brian purchases cosmetics that have been tested on animals he is acting 
contrary to Mary‟s conviction; if he doesn‟t purchase such goods, he is acting in 
accordance with Mary‟s conviction. Note that, as these examples demonstrate, one 
can act in accordance with and contrary to a moral conviction without actually 
possessing that conviction. There is thus a distinction between acting in accordance 
with a normative conviction and acting on the basis of that conviction (see §3.2). 
 Second, this in turn provides a basis on which to distinguish the moral content 
of moral convictions from the content of common descriptively representational 
states, such as beliefs about the weather. For while there are more-or-less determinate 
ways in which one can act in accordance with and contrary to the former, there is no 
way in which one can act in accordance with or contrary to the later. That Brian 
believes it is raining outside fails to recommend any course of action that one can 
successfully or unsuccessfully follow. Whether this distinction is enough to mark out 
the moral content of moral convictions as something other than descriptive content 
remains to be seen. 
 
 3.2. Moral convictions, deliberation and action 
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Moral convictions concern how we should act, what sort of character we ought to 
foster and so on. The moral considerations that moral convictions present can also 
feature in our deliberation about what we ought to do, what sort of character we ought 
to foster and so on. Moral considerations can be factors in our decision-making and 
can be used to influence the decisions of others. It is also possible, in favourable 
cases, for moral considerations to „hold sway‟ over competing considerations and 
hence for agents to act on the basis of those moral considerations. In such cases, the 
moral conviction that presents those considerations will feature in the explanation of 
that action. In short, moral convictions do not merely concern how we should act, but 
can effect our decisions about how we will act. 
 Consider again the example of Mary. If Mary is a committed moral person – 
that is, if she not only recognises but also embraces moral norms – and if she holds 
that testing cosmetics on animals is wrong, then this consideration will affect the 
decisions she makes. Suppose Mary is considering whether or not to buy a particular 
lipstick that has been tested on animals. Many factors may affect whether or not Mary 
buys the lipstick, for example: how much it costs, what colour it is, whether or not it 
was tested on animals and so on. In some cases, the moral consideration may be 
„trumped‟ by competing considerations and Mary will buy the lipstick anyway. In 
others, the moral consideration may „hold sway‟ and Mary will not buy the lipstick, 
because (maybe among other things) it was tested on animals. In both types of case, 
Mary‟s moral conviction (or the moral consideration it presents) exerts a force on her 
motivations; in the latter case, it is part of the explanation for why she acted as she 
did. 
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 This example illustrates three further senses in which moral convictions are 
practical. 
 First, if an agent embraces moral norms then the considerations presented by 
those norms will feature in her practical deliberations, that is, her deliberations about 
what to do. Mere recognition that some action is recommended or discouraged from a 
particular point of view will not be an element in practical deliberation. I may 
recognise, for example, that (western) etiquette demands that one not slurp one‟s 
food, but this will not enter my deliberations unless I want to follow the rules of 
(western) etiquette.  
 Second, if an agent embraces moral norms, then her moral convictions will 
affect the way she behaves. This is to say that an agent who embraces moral norms 
will have a certain tendency to act in ways consistent with those norms and that, other 
things being equal, she will act in those ways. For Mary this means that, other things 
being equal, she will not purchase cosmetics that have been tested on animals. Of 
course, other things rarely are equal and competing considerations may outweigh 
moral ones. In such cases, however, moral considerations remain to be outweighed.  
 Finally, the example demonstrates that in some cases moral considerations 
may „hold sway‟, that is, outweigh competing considerations. When this happens, the 
agent will not merely act in accordance with her moral conviction, but will act on the 
basis of that conviction. This is not to say that the moral conviction will be the sole 
basis for the agents‟ action, for she may be moved by other considerations that 
recommend the same course of action. In all cases where moral considerations „hold 
sway‟, however, the agents‟ moral conviction will be at least part of the explanation 
for the agent acting as she did.  
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4. Four Unsuccessful Arguments 
 
We have, then, four senses in which moral convictions are practical: 
 P1.  They have normative content. 
 P2. Their contents can features in agents‟ practical deliberations. 
 P3. They can affect agents‟ behavioural dispositions. 
 P4. They can feature in the explanation of agents‟ actions. 
(In the last three cases, the „can‟ is important, for we have seen no reason to think that 
moral convictions always feature in deliberation, affect behavioural dispositions or 
explain action. I shall assess these stronger claims in §§5-6.) The question is whether 
these four senses provide plausible arguments from practicality. 
 
 4.1. First Argument from Practicality 
 
Plugging P1 into the general schema for arguments from practicality set out in §2 
generates the following: 
 
 1P1. Moral convictions have normative content. 
2P2. No purely descriptively representational state can have normative 
content. 
 Therefore 
 3.  Moral convictions are not purely descriptively representational states.
15
 
 
“Expressivism and the Practicality of Moral Convictions” by Neil Sinclair 
 
14 
 This argument fails for the first reason given in §2; namely, the sense of 
practicality it employs is too weak. While it seems undeniable to say that moral 
judgements have normative content, it seems unreasonable to hold that descriptively 
representational states cannot have the descriptive content expressed by sentences 
such as: Testing cosmetics on animals is wrong (premise 2P2). At least absent an 
account what can and cannot be represented to be the case there is no reason to 
suppose that a mental state cannot represent the world as being, precisely, a world in 
which testing cosmetics on animals is wrong. More generally, absent such an account 
there is no reason to suppose that there cannot be purely descriptively representational 
states with normative contents. Thus premise 2P2 remains unsupported and the 
conclusion doesn‟t follow. 
  
 4.2. Second Argument from Practicality 
 
Substituting P2 into the general schema generates the following argument: 
 
1P2.  The content of moral convictions can feature in agents‟ practical 
deliberations. 
2P2. It is not the case that the content of purely descriptively 
representational states can feature in agents‟ practical deliberations. 
 Therefore 
3.  Moral convictions are not purely descriptively representational states. 
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This argument fails for the same reason as the first; namely, that the sense of 
practicality it employs is too weak. For while it is plausible that the content of moral 
convictions can feature in agents‟ practical deliberations (premise 1P2), it is 
implausible to claim (premise 2P2) that the content of a purely descriptive state cannot 
so feature. For example, suppose Brian believes that it is raining outside and is averse 
to getting rained upon. Then the purely descriptive content: It is raining outside will 
feature in Brian‟s deliberations as a consideration in favour of any measures that 
avoid him getting rained upon (staying indoors, taking an umbrella and so on). So this 
purely descriptive content has featured in Brian‟s practical deliberation. Thus premise 
2P2 is false. 
 Expressivists have an obvious reply to this objection. The way in which moral 
contents feature in agents‟ practical deliberations, they will claim, is distinct from the 
way in which descriptive contents features in such deliberations. Several expressivists 
have developed this suggestion, notably Hare and Blackburn.
16
 Their common 
thought is that the moral contents of an agent‟s mental states are of necessary 
relevance to that agent‟s practical deliberations. More precisely the thought is that, 
necessarily, if an agent‟s mental states have moral content that applies to some course 
of action under consideration in practical deliberation then that moral content will 
provide that agent with some deliberative reason for or against that action. For 
example, suppose Rachel is deciding whether to A or B and considers A right. 
According to these expressivists the moral content A is right will necessarily be taken 
by Rachel to be a reason in favour of A-ing. When, as here, the reason is conclusive, 
the moral content will provide an answer to Rachel‟s deliberative question „What 
shall I do?‟ When the reason is less than conclusive (as for example, when Rachel‟s 
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judgement is that A is generous) it will not by itself determine the practical issue but 
will still retain commendatory force. In both cases the moral content remains relevant 
to the deliberative question. Descriptive contents, in contrast, can sometimes be 
relevant to practical deliberation, but are never necessarily so. Thus, in the example 
above, the descriptive content It is raining outside is only of relevance to Brian‟s 
practical deliberation given his aversion to getting rained upon. Should Brian be 
indifferent to climactic conditions the same content would not provide a deliberative 
reason. So moral contents are of necessary relevance to practical deliberation whereas 
the relevance of descriptive contents is at best only contingent. It follows that moral 
contents cannot be descriptive contents and descriptivism is false. (Note that, unlike 
the other arguments so far discussed, this form of the argument from practicality does 
suffice to establish expressivism and not merely refute the first version of 
descriptivism.) 
 There are two problems with this argument. First, it is not clear that moral 
contents have a necessary, as opposed to merely ubiquitous relevance to practical 
deliberation. Suppose for example, that most members of a community have an 
aversion to getting rained upon. Suppose this aversion is so common and deep-seated 
that the members of the community take it for granted in all their interactions and 
deliberations. In such a scenario the statement „It is raining‟ may seem to take on a 
necessary relevance to the practical deliberations of members of this community. But 
of course this practical relevance is still contingent on agents‟ aversions to getting 
rained upon – it only appears necessary because of the ubiquity of that aversion. The 
same might well apply for moral contents. The apparent necessary relevance of moral 
contents to practical deliberation may be the result of some ubiquitous concern that 
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those contents engage with, for example an aversion to morally objectionable actions. 
Alternatively, moral contents themselves may be analysable into non-moral contents 
that, contingently, have a ubiquitous practical relevance. For example, on Railton‟s 
version of descriptivism the conviction that an action is right represents that action as 
one that would be approved of by instrumentally rational agents when counting 
equally the interests of all potentially affected individuals and when fully and vividly 
informed. Railton then notes: „Since in public discourse and private reflection we are 
often concerned with whether our conduct is justifiable from a general rather than 
merely personal standpoint, it therefore is far from arbitrary that we attach so much 
importance to morality as a standard of criticism and self-criticism‟.17 This extensive 
practical relevance could again be mistaken for necessary relevance. Furthermore, the 
existence of an understandable attitude of indifference to moral concerns when 
practically deliberating supports this view: for such cases can be taken as evidence of 
situations under which the otherwise ubiquitous concern with which moral 
considerations engage is absent. Until these alternative hypotheses are ruled out the 
expressivist has provided no reason to think that the practical relevance of moral 
contents is necessary rather than merely ubiquitous.  
However, even if expressivists could make a case for the necessary practical 
relevance of moral contents, it doesn‟t follow that moral contents are not descriptive. 
For though a necessary practical relevance would suffice to distinguish moral contents 
from mundane descriptive contents such as those concerning the weather, further 
argument is required to show that this relevance would distinguish moral contents 
from the class of descriptive contents as a whole. For descriptivists can insist that 
moral contents are just that special species of descriptive content that have a 
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necessary relevance to practical deliberation. More precisely, descriptivists can claim 
that moral convictions are states that represent the world as being, precisely, a world 
in which certain choices and paths are morally commended or obligatory. Such states 
have descriptive content in so far as they offer a representation of the world but also 
have necessary practical relevance in so far as the representations they offer are of a 
world in which certain choices are morally preferable or obligatory. So such states 
have descriptive content characterisable by moral sentences and that content is of 
necessary practical relevance. To take the example of rightness, the descriptivist can 
claim that moral convictions concerning rightness describe the world as one in which 
certain intentions are morally correct.
18
 So Rachel‟s conviction that A is right 
descriptively represents the world as being such that an intention on behalf of Rachel 
to A is the morally correct intention. Absent a general theory of descriptive 
representation there is no reason to doubt that a mental state can represent the world 
thus. Since the contents of such states are of necessary practical relevance the 
rejuvenated expressivist argument fails. 
 
 4.3. Third Argument from Practicality 
 
Substituting P3 into the general schema for arguments from practicality generates the 
following argument: 
 
 1P3. Moral convictions can affect agents‟ behavioural dispositions. 
 2P3. No purely descriptively representational state can affect agents‟  
behavioural dispositions.   
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 Therefore 
 3.  Moral convictions are not purely descriptive representational states. 
   
 This argument fails for the same reason as the previous two: the sense of 
practicality is too weak to make the second premise plausible.  
The example of Mary in the opening paragraph gives us reason to accept that 
moral convictions can affect agents‟ behavioural tendencies (premise 1P3). It seems 
implausible, however, to claim (premise 2P3) that no purely descriptively 
representational state can have a similar influence. Consider Brian. If Brian believes 
that it is raining outside and if he hates getting rained upon then his behaviour will be 
accordingly affected. Other things being equal he will not go outside for the time 
being or will make sure that if he does then he takes an umbrella. If Brian didn‟t 
believe that it was raining outside then he wouldn‟t be reluctant to go outside (at least 
not on this count). Therefore Brian‟s belief about the weather – a purely descriptive 
representational state – can affect his behavioural dispositions. 
 Again, there is an expressivist riposte. The way in which moral convictions 
affect agents‟ behavioural tendencies, they will claim, is distinct from the way in 
which purely descriptive representational states do the same. I shall discuss, and 
dismiss, two suggestions along this line in §§5-6. A third suggestion can be dismissed 
here. Expressivists may argue that moral convictions affect agents‟ behavioural 
dispositions in certain determinate ways, whereas purely descriptively 
representational states can affect agents‟ behaviours in multifarious ways, depending 
on the content of desire, concern or preference (that is, directively representational 
state) they are coupled with. So while, for example, the moral judgement that testing 
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cosmetics on animals is wrong affects all agents who accept it in similar ways (not to 
purchase cosmetics tested on animals, for instance), the belief that it is raining outside 
can affect agents‟ behaviours in many ways, depending, in the simplest case, on the 
agent‟s attitude to getting rained upon. However, although this marks a genuine 
difference between moral convictions and states such as the belief that it is raining 
outside, it is an insufficient basis on which to distinguish moral convictions from 
purely descriptively representational states. For the fact that moral convictions affect 
agents‟ behaviours in certain determinate ways is a mere consequence of their 
normative content, and again, we have seen no reason to doubt that normative content 
can be descriptive content. Normative contents serve to recommend or discourage 
certain paths of action whereas mundane descriptive contents do not. It is no surprise, 
therefore, that states that possess such normative contents affect behaviour in ways 
commensurate with that recommendation or discouragement. But, at least absent a 
theory of descriptive representation, this is compatible with the content of such states 
being descriptively representational.  
 
 4.4. Fourth Argument from Practicality 
 
Substituting P4 into the general schema generates the following argument: 
 
 1P4. Moral convictions can feature in explanations of agents‟ actions. 
2P4. No purely descriptively representational state can feature in an 
explanation of agents‟ actions. 
 Therefore 
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 3.  Moral convictions are not purely descriptive representational states. 
 
 This argument fails for the same reason as the previous three. By assigning a 
weak sense of practicality to moral convictions (premise 1P4) it fails to rule out purely 
descriptively representational states being practical in the same sense (premise 2P4). 
We have seen how moral convictions can feature in explanations of agents‟ actions. 
Unfortunately, it is equally easy to see that purely descriptively representational states 
can play a similar role. If Brian believes that it is raining outside, if he prefers not to 
get rained upon and if the consideration this belief presents holds sway in his 
deliberations then Brian will act on the basis of this belief and the belief will play a 
part in explaining his actions. Thus premise 2P4 is false and, once again, the argument 
has failed. 
 As before, there is a quick expressivist reply. The way in which moral 
convictions feature in explanations of agents‟ actions, they will claim, is distinct from 
the way in which purely descriptively representational states can feature in such 
explanations. In the next two sections I shall discuss, and dismiss, two suggestions 
along this line. 
 
5. Two Further Senses of Practicality 
 
Are there any further senses in which moral convictions are practical? We have seen 
that moral convictions, like purely descriptively representational states, can affect 
agents‟ behavioural tendencies as well as feature in explanations of their actions. It 
has also been suggested that moral convictions may have a distinct kind of effect on 
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behaviour and a distinct kind of role in the explanation of action that serves to 
distinguish them from purely descriptively representational states. What might these 
be? 
 A common suggestion is that moral convictions have a distinct effect on 
behaviour and a distinct role in action explanation that is the result of moral 
convictions having some special connection to our motives. To have a motive is to 
have a goal or purpose. In terms of the earlier discussion, motives are directively 
representational state of mind, that is, mental states that represent the world so as to 
be made that some state of affairs is realised. That state of affairs is one‟s goal. 
According to the standard Humean model our purposive behaviours are affected in 
different ways by our motives and by our beliefs.
19
 Roughly, our motives set us our 
goals and our beliefs determine the means we take in pursuit of those goals. Thus my 
desire (motive) for some chocolate will affect my behaviour by causing me to act in 
ways in which I believe will lead to my acquisition of some chocolate. Conversely, 
my belief that there is some chocolate in the fridge will affect my behaviour by 
determining the means I take to pursue my motives concerning chocolate. In the case 
where both elements are present, they will cause me to go to the fridge in the hope of 
acquiring some chocolate. Accordingly, on this picture, action explanation always 
involves reference to two distinct elements: a motive that tells one what the agent was 
hoping to achieve in so acting and a belief that tells one why the agent took the 
particular way to pursuing that goal that he did. The suggestion under consideration is 
that moral convictions affect agents‟ behaviour and explain agents‟ actions through 
connection with their motives rather than beliefs. There are two ways in which this 
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connection might be spelled out, which provide two further senses of practicality 
(which I shall label P5 and P6). 
 
 P5. In the first case, one might claim that moral convictions are intrinsically 
connected to agents‟ motives, that is to say, when moral convictions influence agents‟ 
motives, they do so without reference to any further state of the agent. This serves to 
distinguish moral convictions from more mundane beliefs that may be connected to 
agents‟ motives, but only by channelling a pre-existing motive into a new, more 
specific form. For example, the belief that there is chocolate in the fridge may give 
rise to a motive to go to the fridge. But it will only do so by channelling a pre-existing 
motive, such as the motive to acquire some chocolate. The claim here is that when 
moral convictions influence motives, they do so intrinsically, that is, without 
reference to any antecedent motive. The claim would be, for example, that the moral 
conviction that testing cosmetics on animals is wrong can give rise to the motive not 
to purchase cosmetics that have been tested on animals without having to channel any 
pre-existing motive. Hence the fully displayed explanation of any actions that result 
from this motive need refer only to the moral conviction and the beliefs it is coupled 
with.  
 There are two important points to note about this suggestion.  
First, the suggestion is not that moral convictions can give rise to any motive, 
but that they can give rise to appropriate motives, where a motive is appropriate 
relative to a moral conviction just in case it is a motive to act in ways that are in 
accordance with the normative content of that conviction. In the case of a conviction 
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that a type of action is wrong, the appropriate motive will be a motive not to partake 
in actions of that kind and to encourage others to do likewise.  
Second, it doesn‟t follow that when moral convictions give rise to appropriate 
motives the moral conviction will always play a role in the explanation of the agent 
acting as she does or that the agent will even act in accordance with that conviction. 
This is because the agent may act in accordance with her moral conviction for some 
reason other than that provided by the moral conviction or she may have competing 
motives that outweigh that engendered by the moral conviction, causing her to act in 
ways that are not in accordance with the moral judgement at all.  
 
 P6. In the second case, one might claim that moral convictions are, in an 
interesting way, necessarily connected to agents‟ motives, which is to say that having 
a moral conviction is itself sufficient for an agent to have appropriate motives. More 
precisely, the claim is that: necessarily, if an agent has a moral conviction, then she 
will have some corresponding set of appropriate motives. As before, a motive is 
appropriate just in case it is a motive to act in ways that are in accordance with the 
normative content of the moral conviction. This view is often labelled „internalism‟.20 
For example, in the case of Mary, the mere fact that she considers testing cosmetics 
on animals to be wrong will be sufficient for her to have the set of appropriate 
motives – for example, the motive not to purchase cosmetics on animals and the 
motive to prevent others from doing so. There are two points to note about this 
suggestion. 
 First, as before, it doesn‟t follow that an agents‟ moral conviction will always 
play a role in her acting as she does or that she will always act in ways that are in 
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accordance with it. The presence of other, stronger, motives will undermine both 
possibilities. So any motivation arising from the moral conviction will be defeasible.  
 Second, internalism fails to determine the precise nature of the necessary 
connection between moral convictions and appropriate motivations. In the first case, 
the necessary connection may be the result of the fact that the moral conviction is 
simply identical with the set of appropriate motivations. In the second case, the 
necessary connection may be a connection between two distinct states: the moral 
conviction and the set of appropriate motives.
21
 In the former case, this sense of 
practicality (P6) entails the previous sense (P5). In the latter case, it does not, since 
the necessary connection between moral convictions and appropriate motives may be 
the result of some generic antecedent motive.  
 
6. Two more unsuccessful arguments 
 
The forgoing discussion has produced two further ways in which moral convictions 
may be claimed to be practical: 
 P5. They can be intrinsically connected to agents‟ motives 
 P6. They are necessarily connected to agents‟ motives 
 
 6.1. Fifth argument from practicality 
 
Substituting P5 into the general schema of arguments from practicality provides the 
following argument: 
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 1P5. Moral convictions can be intrinsically connected to agents‟ motives. 
2P5. No purely descriptively representational state can be intrinsically 
connected to agents‟ motives.  
 Therefore 
 3.  Moral convictions are not purely descriptive representational states. 
 
 Unfortunately for the expressivist, this argument fails for the second reason 
listed in §2, namely that the sense of practicality it assigns to moral convictions is too 
strong. This makes premise 2P5 plausible only at the expense of rendering premise 1P5 
unsupported. 
 The second premise appears well supported by examples. Brian‟s belief that it 
is raining outside will only affect his motives if it is accompanied by an appropriate 
desire, preference or similar directively representational state. If Brian prefers not to 
get rained upon this belief will provide him with a motive to stay indoors; if he likes 
getting rained upon then this belief will provide him with a motive to go outside. In 
the absence of any such attitude, however, Brian‟s beliefs will not give rise to any 
motives at all.  
 Once the second premise is granted the weight of the argument falls on the 
first. But this premise is unsupported. There is little reason to suppose that moral 
convictions are practical in the sense given in P5. As we have seen, moral convictions 
can have normative content, can feature distinctively in agents‟ practical 
deliberations, can affect their behaviours in directed ways and can explain their 
actions, all without being intrinsically motivational. It is hard to see, therefore, in 
what sense being intrinsically connected to motives adds to their practical import.  
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 It may be argued that an intrinsic connection to motives removes an element 
of contingency from the motivational effects of moral convictions, for whether or not 
they motivate is not dependent on some external moral motive, which may be absent. 
However, P5 only states that moral convictions can be intrinsically motivational, 
which is to say that when they give rise to motives, they do so by themselves. This 
still leaves it a contingent (and as yet unexplained) matter as to whether or not a 
particular moral conviction will provide a motive. To remove the contingency 
requires the claim that moral convictions are necessarily connected to motives, that is, 
that moral convictions are practical in sense P6. By itself P5 fails to remove the 
contingency. 
 In the absence of further argument there is no reason to hold that moral 
convictions are practical in the sense that they can be intrinsically connected to 
agents‟ motives. The fact that moral judgements are practical simply underdetermines 
whether or not they are so connected. Thus premise 1P5 remains unsupported and the 
conclusion doesn‟t follow. 
 
 6.2. Sixth argument from practicality 
 
The sixth argument from practicality results from substituting P6 into the general 
schema: 
 
1P6. Moral convictions are necessarily connected to agents‟ motives in the 
way posited by internalism.  
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2P6. No purely descriptively representational state can be necessarily 
connected to motives in the same way.  
 Therefore 
 3.  Moral convictions are not purely descriptive representational states. 
 
In this argument, the necessary connection posited by internalism is as follows: that 
necessarily, if an agent has a moral conviction then she will have the corresponding 
set of appropriate motives. If moral convictions have this connection, but purely 
descriptively representational states must lack it, then it follows that moral 
convictions cannot be purely descriptively representational states.
22
  
 As before, I shall grant the second premise for the sake of argument. Once 
again, however, this puts an unbearable weight on the first. For there is little reason to 
suppose that moral judgements are necessarily connected to motives in this way. As 
we have seen, moral judgements can have normative content, can play a distinctive 
ubiquitous (or near-ubiquitous) role in agents‟ deliberations, can affect agents‟ 
behaviours in directed ways and can explain their actions, all without being 
necessarily connected to motives in the way internalism demands. Boatright puts the 
point succinctly: 
 
[T]he practicality of moral [convictions] surely requires that there must be 
some element or feature in virtue of which moral [convictions] have the 
power to affect human behaviour, but there is no reason as yet why it must 
be a…necessary one.23 
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In the absence of further argument, therefore, there is no reason to hold that moral 
convictions are practical in the sense posited by internalism. Hence premise 1P6 
remains unmotivated and the conclusion of the argument doesn‟t follow.  
 
7. A further objection to the fifth and sixth arguments 
 
If my arguments of §6 are correct it follows that the mere practicality of moral 
convictions fails to establish them as either intrinsically or necessarily connected to 
motivation. But the possibility of other arguments for these claims remains. Until all 
such arguments have been dismissed, my claim that the first premises of the final two 
arguments for practicality are unsupported must remain provisional. Fortunately, my 
case against arguments from practicality has another component. In this section I will 
argue that even if we grant that moral convictions are practical in senses P5 and P6, 
and therefore grant the conclusions of the final two arguments from practicality, we 
are no closer to establishing expressivism.  
 
 Suppose we accept the conclusion of the sixth argument, namely that moral 
convictions are not purely descriptively representational states. This is compatible 
with moral convictions being what I shall call hybrid states, that is, states with both 
descriptively representational and directively representational (that is, motivational) 
content. Furthermore, it is also compatible with the moral content of such states being 
(a part of) their descriptively representational content and hence compatible with 
descriptivism. This can be demonstrated with an example.   
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 Consider the moral conviction that testing cosmetics on animals is wrong. If 
internalism is true then this conviction will be necessarily connected to the set of 
appropriate motives, that is, to the set of motives with the appropriate directively 
representational content. Thus, we might say, the moral conviction that testing 
cosmetics on animals is wrong is sufficient for the set of appropriate motives that 
include:  
 
(a) The directively representational state that represents the world so as to be 
made such that: One doesn’t purchase cosmetics that have been tested in 
animals 
(b) The directively representational state that represents the world so as to be 
made such that: No one else purchases cosmetics that have been tested on 
animals.
24
 
One way in which this connection will be maintained is if the moral conviction simply 
includes as a part this set of motives. Let us suppose that this is so. Then the truth of 
internalism entails that the moral conviction that testing cosmetics on animals is 
wrong is partly constituted by the set of appropriate motives that include (a) and (b).  
 However, this is still compatible with the same conviction having 
descriptively representational content: Testing cosmetics on animals is wrong. As 
several authors have noted, there is no objection to a single state having both the 
mind-to-world direction of fit associated with descriptive contents and the world-to-
mind direction of fit associated with directive contents so long as these two contents 
are distinct.
25
 This can happen here. In so far as the moral conviction is descriptively 
representational it can represent that world as being such that: Testing cosmetics on 
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animals is wrong. In so far as the same conviction is directively representational it 
represents the world so as to be made such that: One doesn’t purchase cosmetics 
tested on animals (and so on). Since these two contents are distinct, it is possible that 
they combine in the same conviction whilst attaching to different directions of fit. On 
this view, moral convictions are hybrid states with a special connection between the 
two contentful components: for the directively representational content is determined 
by the descriptively representational content. In this example, the moral conviction 
that testing cosmetics on animals is wrong is the conviction that both represents the 
world as being such that certain paths of action (purchasing cosmetics tested on 
animals) are morally inappropriate and that represents the world as to be made such 
that no one partakes in those paths of action. This special connection notwithstanding, 
the descriptive content and directive content are distinct, so the conviction that 
possesses them both is a possibility.  
 The claim that moral convictions are such hybrid states is compatible with 
both premises of the final argument from practicality. In so far as such states involve 
as an essential component certain motives (directively representational contents) then 
internalism is satisfied (premise 1P6). In so far as such states are not, by that very fact, 
purely descriptively representational, premise 2P6 is also satisfied. Since the argument 
is valid, it follows that the conclusion of the argument – that moral convictions are not 
purely descriptively representational states – fails to rule out the possibility that moral 
convictions are such hybrid states. And since, if moral convictions are such hybrids, 
their moral content is descriptive content, it follows that the argument fails to rule out 
the truth of (this version of) descriptivism.  
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The same point can be made for the fifth argument from practicality. For 
moral convictions may sometimes include appropriate motives while still having 
moral content that is descriptive. Again, because the contents of these two elements 
are distinct, and because there is no reason in general to doubt that states can possess 
both directions of fit (so long as they attach to distinct contents), there is no reason to 
deny this possibility. And the fact that the conclusion of the argument fails to rule out 
this possibility shows that the conclusion cannot help to establish the truth of 
expressivism.   
The moral is this: even accepting that moral convictions have some privileged 
tie to our motives, it doesn‟t follow that their moral content is not descriptive content. 
For a connection with appropriate motives only shows that moral convictions have a 
distinct, non-moral, directive content. And this is perfectly compatible with them 
continuing to possess moral descriptive content. Thus even granting their first and 
second premises, the final two arguments from practicality fail rule out the truth of 
descriptivism. They thus represent no progress in establishing the truth of 
expressivism.   
 
8. A Humean Reply 
 
The above rejection of the final two arguments from practicality relies on the claim 
that states that represent the world as being some way (descriptive representation) 
may also represent the world so as to be made another way (directive representation). 
Since such states are, by that token, not purely descriptively representational, 
admitting their existence is compatible the second premise of each argument. But this 
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argumentative move might be considered disingenuous. What the defender of the 
these arguments had meant to assert, surely, is not that no purely descriptively 
representational state can be connected to motives but that no descriptively 
representational state at all can be connected to motives, that is, no state that involves 
any descriptive content can also involve directive content. With this as the second 
premise the final argument becomes: 
 
1P6. Moral convictions are necessarily connected to agents‟ motives in the 
way posited by internalism.  
2*. No descriptively representational state can be necessarily connected to 
motives in the same way.  
 Therefore 
 3*.  Moral convictions are not descriptive representational states. 
 
Unlike the previous arguments, the conclusion of this argument is not compatible with 
the view that the moral content of moral convictions is descriptively content. So it 
provides a potentially stronger case for expressivism.
26
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 Potentially, perhaps. Actually, no. The problem is that no reason has been 
offered in support of premise 2*. Why suppose that no descriptively representational 
state can be necessarily connected to motivation in the way posited by internalism? 
Hume certainly thought that no belief could be motivationally engaged in this way, a 
claim that has since been enshrined as one part of the view known as Humean 
Psychology. 
 Here is Hume himself:   
 
[R]eason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will…[and] can 
never oppose passion in the direction of the will.
27
  
 
Unfortunately the argument here cannot rely on authority. Furthermore, there are 
plausible counterexamples to this Humean premise. Milikan has discussed the case of 
the state of a mother hen responsible for the call to it‟s chicks: here the mother hen is 
in a state that both represents the world as being one in which there is food around 
(descriptive representation) and represents the world as being so as to be made that 
her chicks come and eat it (directive representation) – the latter providing a 
connection to motives. Thus premise 2
*
 is false and the conclusion doesn‟t follow.28  
 
Before this line of argument is given up too quickly, however, it is worth 
considering another possible expressivist defence. For the expressivist might accept 
that although being distinct from any motivational (directively representational) 
element is not definitive of all descriptively representational states, it is nevertheless 
definitive of the distinct type of representational states that exist in mature 
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deliberating humans. After all, Humean Psychology, of which Premise 2* is a part, 
arises from an examination of the nature of agency, the paradigm cases of which are 
mature deliberating humans. It is natural to think, therefore, that the condition on 
descriptively representational states on which Humean Psychology insists (namely 
their disconnectedness from motivation) applies first and foremost (and perhaps only) 
to the states of mature deliberating agents. If this is the case then the expressivist 
might be able to bypass the example of the hen‟s call to its chicks through utilising the 
following argument: 
 
1P6. Moral convictions are necessarily connected to agents‟ motives in the 
way posited by internalism. 
2
**
. No descriptively representational state possessed by a mature 
deliberating agent is necessarily connected to motives in the same way. 
S. Moral convictions are states of mature deliberating agents. 
Therefore 
3
*
. Moral convictions are not descriptively representational states. 
 
The problem with this argument is with the second premise (Premise 2**). There are 
indeed two generally recognised ways in which the descriptively representational 
states of organisms can determine their actions: according to former (the one at work 
in the example of the hen‟s call to her chicks) descriptively representational states are 
necessarily connected to motivations; according to the latter (the one at work in most 
human cases) they are not. It is also the case that in mature deliberating humans, the 
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latter mechanism is generally at work. But it doesn‟t follow that that this is always the 
case, that is, it doesn‟t follow that 2** is true. I will argue these points in turn. 
 
 (i) The first point is best made with a bit of evolutionary background. 
Individuals who hope to thrive in an environment will need to have some way of 
acquiring information about that environment. Through evolutionary selection, all 
species have been equipped with systems that allow them to this, for example, visual 
systems such as the human eye and photosensitive cells. These systems fulfil their 
evolutionary function when they produce descriptively representational states, that is, 
states that represent the world as being thus and so, thus enabling individuals of that 
species to guide themselves through their environment. 
The ultimate evolutionary aim of these systems is to aid reproductive success, 
but there is more than one way in which the products of these systems can be used to 
further this aim. 
In the simplest case, the descriptively representational states produce actions 
that directly address the biological needs of the individual, that is to say, the content 
of the descriptively representational states is processed (that is, connected to action) in 
such a way as to produce actions that will aid the individuals reproductive success, 
given that the descriptive representation is accurate. A case involving bees will 
illustrate. The antennae of honeybees are (among other things) sensitive to the 
presence of oleic acid, a chemical they come across most commonly when it is given 
off by decaying honeybee corpses. The state of the antenna when it detects this acid 
causes the bees to remove the source of the acid from the hive.
29
 The connection 
between the descriptively representational state of the antenna and the action it 
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prompts, however, is hard-wired in the sense that there is no possibility – given the 
actual constitution of the bee – of the information provided by the descriptively 
representational state being used to produce other actions: where the bees sense oleic 
acid, they will remove its source. (This can provide for tragic circumstances – for 
example, honeybees will remove a bee tainted with oleic acid even if it is still patently 
alive.) Furthermore, that this particular action, and no other, is hard-wired is because 
it is this action that will (most) aid the reproductive success of the honeybees. So the 
bees use their descriptively representational states produced by their antennae in a 
very direct way: they are translated directly into those specific actions what will aid 
reproductive success, given that the descriptively representational state describes 
accurately. Biologists label such behaviour „sphexish‟, after a genus of digger wasp 
that provides another common example.  
There is, however, a more complicated way in which individuals can use their 
descriptively representational states in ways that will further their reproductive 
success. On this model, the behaviours which descriptively representational states 
prompt are determined, not by a hard-wiring of responses aimed at fulfilling the 
individuals‟ biological needs, but by the particular motives (directively 
representational states) present in the individual, where an individual‟s particular 
motivations correlate reasonably well (but not infallibly) with the individual‟s 
biological needs. On this system of action production, there is no reproduction-aiding 
hard-wired behaviour associated with each type of descriptively representational state; 
rather, descriptively representational states produce actions that satisfy the particular 
motives they are coupled with, under the proviso that those motivations are generally 
(though not always) commensurate with the basic biological needs of the individual. 
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In short, the same descriptively representational state can serve the aims of different 
motivations. (Recall Hume‟s „slave of the passions‟ metaphor.) An imaginary case of 
a hyper-intelligent bee will illustrate this sort of mechanism. Suppose the hyper-
intelligent bee has visual mechanisms for producing descriptive representations 
concerning the location of nectar. For hyper-intelligent bees, there is no direct hard-
wired connection between such states and any particular behaviour. Rather, the action 
that the descriptively representational state will prompt is determined by the peculiar 
motivations of the particular hyper-intelligent bee. If the bee is motivated to (desires 
to) help the gathering of nectar, then he will „dance‟, thus helping other bees locate 
and harvest the nectar. If the bee is motivated otherwise – for example, to ignore the 
nectar, perhaps because the hive is full – then no such dancing will result. So the 
hyper-intelligent bee translates his descriptively representational states into action 
only through the medium of his particular motivations, where these motivations 
generally (but not infallibly) track his biological needs.
30
 
There are no doubt evolutionary advantages and disadvantages to each of 
these action-producing mechanisms, but importantly for our purposes these two 
different ways in which descriptively representational states may be processed into 
action have different consequences for the motivational engagement of such states. In 
the first case – the honeybee case – the descriptively representational states are 
necessarily connected to a corresponding motivation, the connection between them 
having been determined by selective pressures. In the second case – the hyper-
intelligent bee case – there is no necessary connection between any descriptively 
representational state and any particular motive. In the first case, therefore, 
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descriptively representational states are motivationally engaged. In the second case, 
they are motivationally detached.  
 
(ii) The second point is that the latter, more sophisticated mechanism is 
generally at work in the case of mature deliberating humans. When it comes to their 
action-guiding mechanisms, mature humans are hyper-intelligent bees. That is, mature 
humans typically use their descriptively representational states to guide their actions 
only through combining them with distinct, contingently present, motivations: in their 
case, desires. This claim can be empirically supported: if mature human actions were 
not generated in this way, then we would behave differently from the ways we know 
we do behave. For example, if human behaviours were hard-wired then the same 
descriptively representational state would always lead to the same behaviour, which 
we know not to be the case. 
 
But from these two points it doesn‟t follow that all the descriptively 
representational states of mature deliberating humans are necessarily detached from 
motivations in the way asserted in premise 2**. For the possibility remains that some 
of our descriptively representational states are, like the descriptively representational 
states of the honeybee, necessarily connected to motivations (directive 
representations). Moral convictions are good candidates for such states.  To put the 
point another way, though it might be the case that our „mature‟ deliberative systems 
fit the second, sophisticated model – and hence that the descriptively representational 
states that partake in such a system are necessarily detached from motivations – it 
doesn‟t follow that all our descriptively representational states partake in such a 
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system. It remains a possibility that our mature deliberative system works alongside a 
sphexish motivational system that employs a different workforce of (motivationally 
engaged) descriptively representational states. It follows that premise 2
**
 is false and 
the expressivist conclusion doesn‟t follow. 
 
 In this context it is interesting to consider Lewis‟ argument against the 
possibility of states that are descriptively representational and yet necessarily 
connected to motivation – so-called „besires‟.31 Lewis argues that the existence of 
such states is incompatible with decision theory, which is a „…well worked-out 
formal theory of belief, desire, and what it means to serve our desires according to our 
beliefs‟ and is „surely…fundamentally right‟.32 The problem with this argument is that 
it may well be that besires cannot be part of any deliberative process that is modelled 
by decision theory, but this simply goes to show that besires, if they exist, are not part 
of the deliberative processes of mature agents that are modelled by such a theory. 
Such a conclusion fails to rule out the possibility of besires – it merely restricts the 
roles they could play. The preceding argument has the same form: it may well be that 
moral convictions (considered as descriptive states necessarily connected to 
appropriate motivations) cannot be part of any deliberative process that fits the 
sophisticated model exemplified by hyper-intelligent bees. But this simply goes to 
show that moral convictions, if they exist, are not part of the human deliberative 
process that is modelled in this way. It is for this reason that restricting the condition 
of motivational detachment to just those descriptively representational states involved 
in the mature deliberative systems of humans provides no support for expressivism. 
The problem is that it remains an open question whether or not moral convictions are 
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part of such a system. Lewis‟ argument fails in a similar way: it remains an open 
question whether besires are part of the system modelled by decision theory. 
To summarise this section. The Humean condition on the nature of 
descriptively representational states (premise 2*) fails – in conjunction with the thesis 
of internalism – to provide a convincing argument for expressivism because it is false. 
Furthermore although the Humean theory is more plausibly true of some subset of the 
descriptively representational states that are part of the deliberative processes of 
mature humans, there can be no guarantee that moral convictions are part of this class. 
If follows that there can be no argument for expressivism that employs both the thesis 
of internalism and a plausible version of the Humean view of descriptively 
representational states. Once again, considerations of the practicality of moral 
convictions have failed to advance the case for expressivism. 
 
9. Conclusion 
 
There is a long history of arguments for expressivism, from Hume onwards, based on 
the alleged practicality of moral judgements and the states of mind they express. I 
have argued that there is no sense of „practicality‟ that can do the job. Where claims 
of practicality are innocuous they fail to support expressivism. Where they seem to 
provide the prospect of supporting expressivism they are no longer innocuous. 
Furthermore on closer examination the final two senses of practicality do not even 
provide the prospect of supporting expressivism, since accepting that moral 
convictions are practical in these ways is compatible with descriptivism properly 
understood. In addition, Humean Psychology provides no reason to think otherwise. 
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 What then, of the prospects for expressivist accounts of moral judgements? 
Although I have endeavoured to consider as many senses of practicality as possible it 
remains a possibility that there is sense that will make the expressivist argument work. 
Perhaps the expressivist could demarcate such a sense, but the history of unsuccessful 
attempts to do so makes the prospects look bleak.  
Yet there is an alternative path for the expressivist who accepts my arguments. 
At various points in those arguments, I have appealed to the fact that absent a general 
theory of descriptive representation – that is, a theory of what can and cannot be 
represented to be the case – there is no reason to think that our moral convictions 
cannot represent the world in ways that also make those convictions practical. The 
recurring nature of this fault is indicative of the way expressivists have tended to 
approach arguments from practicality: namely by assuming some condition on 
descriptively representational states (for example the Humean condition) and then 
arguing that moral convictions cannot satisfy it. Perhaps, then, expressivists would do 
better to approach these issues in a more systematic way by first addressing the issue 
of the nature of descriptive representation in general before ascertaining whether this 
issue, once settled, can generate successful arguments for their position. Such work 
may well precipitate a significant, though welcome, shift in the accepted motivations 
for expressivism. 
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